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Abstract
Classical de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and so they do not apply, for example, when goods are free. This context includes
many relevant cases such as online newspapers and public attractions. We look for a
complementarity notion that does not rely on price variation and that is: behavioural
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rational or not). We uncover a conict between properties that complementarity
should intuitively possess. We discuss three ways out of the impossibility.
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1 Introduction
Suppose a local government wants to know whether two free public attractions, say a
museum and a park, are complements or substitutes. The authority would be surprised
to hear that this situation does not t the standard denitions of complementarity: they
are based on price elasticities, while in this case both prices are xed at zero. Indeed,
price variations are just a tool to check complementarity: the notion of complementarity
itself is not intrinsically related to price variations.
Similar observations apply in many other situations. Consider online newspapers, re-
views/advice (e.g. nancial) on social networks, public radio broadcasts, le sharing: all
of these goods are often free. Another leading example is that of complementarity in
business practices, such as training the workforce and allowing it more decisional discre-
tion (Brynjolfson and Milgrom [5]). More abstractly, the goods may be characteristics
embodied in the objects of choice, so that any price variation is perfectly correlated be-
tween the goods. Of course there may be no prices at all: is beauty a complement or a
substitute of wealth in a partner?
In this paper we look for denitions of complementarity (and substitutability) between
two goods that (1) are not based on price variations; and (2) are behavioural and model
free, in the sense that they just use choice data as inputs: they do not commit to any
psychological variable (such as utility) as the driver of behaviour, and they do not
rely on assumptions about the specic choice procedure (such as utility maximisation
plus errors) that generates individual consumption data. We uncover a conict between
properties that complementarity should intuitively possess, and we propose three possible
ways out of this conict.
Feature (2) above distinguishes our approach both from the supermodularity ap-
proach (see section 6) and from the recent econometric approaches that deal with the
zero price problem, pioneered by Gentzkow [9]. The latter assume a specic decision
model that underlies choice data, typically an additive Random Utility Model (RUM)
such as the multinomial logit and variations thereof. While these models may be in
practice good approximations of actual behaviour, the recent wave of abstract works on
stochastic choice (e.g. Brady and Rhebeck [4], Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid [8],
Gül, Natenzon and Pesendorfer [10], Manzini and Mariotti [12] among others) has high-
lighted a wide variety of possible choice errors and choice procedures, and so a number
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of reasons why agents behaviour may fail to be described by a logit model, and indeed
even by the much larger class of RUMs. We take this multiplicity of plausible models
seriously. It is therefore interesting to complement those analyses with model-free ones
(see section 7 for an additional discussion of this point).
Complementarity in general is such a central concept in Economics (you had no trouble
grasping the meaning of our initial paragraph) that its study hardly needs to be motivated.
On the one hand, complementarity has deeply engaged some of the giants of the profession
(see the historical overview in Samuelson [16]). On the other hand, knowing whether
goods are complements or substitutes (or neither) is of major practical importance in
disparate areas: for example, suppliers must have information about complementarity
when introducing new products or when pricing existing products; so do regulators to
evaluate the competitiveness of a market; businesses may be reluctant to change a practice
because of its complementarity with another; and so on.
Let us now formulate the problem more precisely. Consider two goods, the online
and the print versions of a newspaper. Available data are in the form (pOP ; pO; pP ; p?),
where pO and pP denote the consumption frequency of the online version only and of the
print version only, respectively, pOP denotes the frequency of joint consumption, and p?
denotes the frequency with which neither version is read. When could one say, on the
basis of these data alone, that the print and online versions are complementary?
One natural answer would seem to be whenever they are positively correlated: that
is, when the posterior probability of reading one version conditional on reading the other
version, pOP
pOP+pP
, is greater than the prior probability, pOP + pO. This interpretation is
often assumed. For example, Brynjolfson and Milgrom [5] write about the measurement
of complementarities in business practices:
Measuring the correlation, or clustering, of practices is perhaps the most com-
mon approach to testing for complementarities (p. 33)
and in the mentioned study by Gentzkow, he writes
The basic fact in the raw data is that a consumer who reads any one paper is
on average more likely to have also read a second paper. If all heterogeneity in
utilities were uncorrelated across papers, this would be strong evidence that
all three are complements.1
1He considers two print papers and one online version.
3
The di¢culty to be solved in this latter case is that the observed correlation may partly
reect correlated unobservable tastes for the goods, rather than true complementarity:
for instance, a news junkie may consume both paper and online versions even when there
is no true complementarity, which in a model of utility driven consumer means a positive
di¤erence between the value of joint consumption and the sum of the values of single good
consumptions.2
In our approach we do not and cannot distinguish between true complementar-
ity/correlation and taste correlation - we just take consumption data at face value.
This allows us to deal also with consumers who, for example, choose on the basis of a
boundedly rational procedure. These consumers may not maximise a utility function.
They may not even have a utility function.
However, we maintain that even so - adopting a purely behavioural, model-free view -
the identication of complementarity with pure correlation cannot be taken for granted.
Statistical association in general captures the idea that more of one variable goes to-
gether with more of the other. This is an intuitive property of complementarity. But,
equally intuitively, we would also expect complementarity to have a di¤erent property,
namely that increases in joint consumption not compensated by increases in single good
consumption should be evidence of complementarity (and similarly, that increases of single
good consumption not compensated by increases in joint consumption should be evidence
of substitutability). As it turns out, these two intuitions are in conict. Suppose that the
data are given by the following table
Read Print Did not read print
Read Online 0:3 0:2
Did not read online 0:2 0:3
that is (pOP ; pO; pP ; p?) = (0:3; 0:2; 0:2; 0:3). Then the data indicate a positive correlation
( pOP
pOP+pP
= 0:6 > 0:5 = pOP + pO). Suppose now that joint consumption rises to p0OP =
0:55 while single good consumptions stay the same. Then the correlation turns negative
( p
0
OP
p0
OP
+p0
P
= 0:73 < 0:75 = p0OP + p
0
O). An increase in joint consumption has transformed
the goods from complementary to substitutes!
Our rst main contribution is to show that this simple example illustrates a deeper
2As Gentzkow shows, in the two good model this is equivalent to a positive compensated cross price
elasticity of demand.
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conict between two seemingly natural principles that criteria for complementarity should
satisfy. One principle is monotonicity: an increase joint consumption accompanied by
decreases in single good consumption should strengthen an existing complementarity.
The second principle is duality: if in a dataset O and P are complementary, then they
are substitutes in the opposite dataset in which the instances of consumption of P are
switched with the instances of non-consumption of P (holding xed the consumption/non-
consumption of O). Duality is evidently satised by all common measures of correlation
and association. This is the dual table of the previous one:
Read print Did not read print
Read online 0:2 0:3
Did not read online 0:3 0:2
theorem 1 and its corollary 1 show that any concept of complementarity that satises
monotonicity and duality must be also unresponsive, in the sense that the level of non-
consumption p? alone determines whether the goods are complements or substitutes,
irrespective of the distribution between single and joint consumption. A second impossi-
bility result (theorem 2) shows that duality and monotonicity are in outright conict if it
is also assumed that the frontier between complementarity and independence is thin, as
is the case for the standard elasticity-based criterion.
We then look for ways out of the impossibility. We rst show that correlation is the
only symmetric criterion of complementarity that satises both duality and a modied
monotonicity condition. Next, we examine a monotonic criterion that is economically
intuitive if the numbers pOP , pO and pP are taken as expressing the values of the respective
options: O and P are complementary (resp., substitutes) if pOP > pO + pP (resp., pOP <
pO + pP ). This criterion satises a di¤erent notion of duality, based on exchanging joint
consumption with total single good consumption. We nally consider a third criterion
for complementarity, which is also monotonic. It says that O and P are complementary
(resp., substitutes) if pOP > max fpO; pPg (resp., pOP < min fpO; pPg). This criterion
satises yet a di¤erent notion of duality, based on exchanging joint consumption with one
type of single good consumption. We consider these as the three main candidate criteria
of complementarity.3
3As a matter of fact, while various commentators (including the authors) have di¤erent preferences
over these three criteria, and any of the three gets some support, none has been suggested outside of the
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Having dened complementarity in these ways, we nally go back, with some examples,
to the question that is usually the starting point of the analysis: How do tastes or cognitive
variables a¤ect complementarity? For example, if choice behaviour is at least in part
guided by preferences, what aspect of preferences makes two good complementary or
substitutes? In order to answer such questions we need to postulate specic models of the
process leading to choice. We look at two models in particular. The rst is the classical
Luce (or multinomial logit) model of stochastic choice. The second is (a simplied version
of) the more recent stochastic consideration set model of Manzini and Mariotti [12] and
Brady and Rehbeck [4]. We discover that in both cases the correlation criterion on data
reects supermodularity types of condition on preferences.
2 Preliminaries
There are two goods, x and y. A datapoint is an ordered four-tuple p = (pxy; px; py; p?)
with pk 2 (0; 1) for k 2 fxy; x; y;?g and
P
k2fxy;x;y;?g pk = 1. The interpretation is that
pxy denotes the probability (or frequency) of joint consumption of x and y, px and py
denote the probabilities of consumption of x but not y and of y but not x, respectively,
and p? denotes the probability of consuming neither x nor y.
We consider the partitions of the space
T =

(a; b; c; d) 2 (0; 1)4 : a+ b+ c+ d = 1
	
in three regions: the complementarity region C, the substitution region S and the indepen-
dence region I. If p 2 C (resp. p 2 S, resp. p 2 I) we say that x and y are complements
(resp. substitutes, resp. independent) at p. We call any such partition a criterion.
Here are some examples of criteria:
Example 1 (correlation):
C =

(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T :
pxy
pxy + py
> pxy + px

S =

(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T :
pxy
pxy + py
< pxy + px

three.
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According to the correlation criterion a datapoint is in C (resp., S) if and only if the
information that one of the goods is consumed increases (resp., decreases) the probability
the other good is also consumed.
Example 2 (additivity)
C = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy > px + pyg
S = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy < px + pyg
The additivity criterion is natural whenever one thinks of the probabilities as express-
ing values (as is the case in the logit model). Then it says that x and y are complements
whenever the value of joint consumption is greater than the sums of the values of the
goods when consumed singly. This is in fact the notion of complementarity used in many
applications, e.g. the literature on bundling (e.g. Armstrong [1]).
Example 3 (maxmin)
C = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy > max fpx; pygg
S = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy < min fpx; pygg
The maxmin criterion ts, for instance, the situation in which one good is an acces-
sory and only the dominant single good consumption is relevant in comparison with
joint consumption to declare complementarity. To check whether steak and pepper are
complementary you may want to compare the probability of consumption of steak with
that of steak and pepper, rather than with that of pepper alone. Substitution is declared
symmetrically.
Example 4 (supermodularity)
C = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy + p? > px + pyg
S = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy + p? < px + pyg
Here the the goods are delcared complementary if a supermodularity condition on
p is satised (with p seen as a function dened on the set of consumption bundles
fxy; x; y;?g). Supermodularity-type conditions capture complementarity when imposed
on an objective function to be maximised (Topkis [17], Milgrom and Roberts [14], Milgrom
and Shannon [15]). Note that the condition is equivalent to pxy + p? > 12 .
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For illustration, consider table 1, calculated on the basis of the Gentzkow [9] data on
5-day readership of the online and print version of the Washington Post:
Read print Did not read print
Read online 0:137 0:043
Did not read online 0:447 0:373
Table 1: Washington Post, 5-day readership of online and print version (Gentzkow [9]).
In this case the above example criteria are in deep conict: the correlation and su-
permodularity criteria indicate that the two versions are complementary, the additivity
criterion indicates that they are substitutes, and the maximin criterion indicates that
they are independent. Therefore, in order to assess the di¤erent criteria, we propose an
axiomatic analysis, looking for natural properties that criteria should possess given the
interpretation.
3 Impossibilities
In this section we study the core conict between properties.
Symmetry:
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C then (a; c; b; d) 2 C.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S then (a; c; b; d) 2 S.
Symmetry says that exchanging the amounts of single good consumptions is immaterial
for the purpose of classifying goods into complementary or substitutes. Samuelson [16]
considers its symmetry as one the two major improvements of the Slutsky-Hicks-Allen-
Schultz compensated denitions compared to the uncompensated one.
Note that the two symmetry conditions imply an analogous property for I: if (a; b; c; d) 2
I, then (a; c; b; d) 2 I. For if (a; c; b; d) 62 I, then one of the two conditions would yield
(a; b; c; d) 62 I.
As explained in the introduction, we view duality as the soul of all association-based
denitions of complementarity and substitution:
Duality
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1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C then (b; a; d; c) 2 S.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S then (b; a; d; c) 2 C.
Suppose that you have two datapoints p and q. Suppose that, whether x is consumed
or not, y is consumed at q with the same frequency with which it is not consumed at p.
If a datapoint were presented in table form, as in the introduction, q would be obtained
from q by switching the rows. For example, q could be obtained when y is consumed
only in weekends while p is obtained when y is consumed only in weekdays (assuming
for simplicity that ys consumption pattern is the same whether x is consumed or not).
In this sense q expresses a behaviour that is the opposite of the behaviour at p. Then
duality says that x and y are complements at p only if they are substitutes at q, and
vice-versa.
Note that, as for Symmetry, the two duality conditions imply a third one, that if
(a; b; c; d) 2 I, then (b; a; d; c) 2 I.
The second main principle we have discussed is:
Monotonicity
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C, (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , a0  a, b  b0 and c  c0 then (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 C.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S, (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , a  a0, b0  b and c0  c then (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 S.
Monotonicity says that, if goods are complements, then an increase in joint consump-
tion without an increase in single consumption cannot transform them into substitutes or
render them independent, and vice-versa.
There do exist criteria that satisfy Symmetry, Duality and Monotonicity: for example,
the supermodularity criterion above. However, this criterion seems highly unsatisfactory,
because it declares the goods complementary at any datapoint for which p? > 12 , for all
possible values of pxy, px and py. Instead, it is desirable that p? should not be decisive
by itself to declare either complementarity or substitution: it should also respond to
variations the frequencies of joint and single consumptions.
The following property captures an even weaker version of this idea. Essentially, it
just excludes the (bizarre) claim that is implicit in a complementarity criterion such as
p? >
1
2
: these goods are clearly complementary: they are rarely consumed together.
While it allows in principle p? to be decisive, it should not be high non-consumption to
indicate complementarity.
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Responsiveness: There exists  2 (0; 1) such that, for all d 2 ( ; 1), (a; b; c; d) 2 S for
some (a; b; c) 2 (0; 1)3.
For example, the correlation criterion satises Responsiveness. It is also satises Sym-
metry and Duality, but, as noted in the introduction, it is not monotonic. The additivity
criterion satises all properties except part (2) of Duality. The maxmin criterion fails
only Duality.
It turns out that all possible symmetric criteria that are correlation-based in the sense
of satisfying duality must either fail Monotonicity or Responsiveness:
Theorem 1 There exists no criterion that satises Symmetry, Monotonicity, Duality and
Responsiveness.
Proof: We start by proving:
Claim: Let (C; I; S) be a criterion that satises Symmetry and Duality. If (a; b; c; d) 2 C
then (d; b; c; a) 2 C.
To see this, suppose (a; b; c; d) 2 C. By Symmetry (a; c; b; d) 2 C. By Duality
(c; a; d; b) 2 S. By Symmetry (c; d; a; b) 2 S. By Duality (d; c; b; a) 2 C. Finally, by
Symmetry (d; b; c; a) 2 C.
Returning to the proof of the main result, suppose that a criterion (C; I; S) satises
Symmetry, Monotonicity, Duality and Responsiveness. By Responsiveness and Duality4
there exists a p = (a; b; c; d) 2 C. Let  = minfa; b; c; dg, and note in particular that it
must be d < 1  .
We will now show that for all q = (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , if d0 > 1    then q 2 C. This
contradicts Responsiveness and thus proves the impossibility. Take such a q, and let
r = (d0; b0; c0; a0). Note that b0 <  (otherwise, if b0  , then d0 > 1   b0 and thus
b0 + d0 > 1), and similarly c0 < . Then d0 > 1    > a, d0 <   a and c0 <   c. By
Monotonicity, r 2 C and by the Claim above, we conclude that q 2 C.
Symmetry is not implied by the other three axioms. For example the criterion given
by C = f(a; b; c; d) : a > bg and S = f(a; b; c; d) : a < bg satises all of them but not
4To see this, recall that by Responsiveness there exists  2 (0; 1) such that, for all d 2 ( ; 1),
(a; b; c; d) 2 S for some (a; b; c) 2 (0; 1)3. Then by (2) of Duality (b; a; d; c) 2 C .
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Symmetry. This - together with the other examples given previously - shows that the
impossibility result of theorem 1 is tight.
To clarify the role played by Symmetry in the impossibility, consider the following
strengthening of Duality.
Duality* Let
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C then (b; a; d; c) 2 S and (c; d; a; b) 2 S.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S then (b; a; d; c) 2 C and (c; d; a; b) 2 C.
Duality* adds to Duality the requirement that switching columns in a table leads to
the same e¤ect as switching rows. In the presence of Symmetry, Duality and Duality* are
equivalent. However Duality* alone does not imply Symmetry. For example the criterion
dened by C = f(a; b; c; d) : b > a and c > dg and S = f(a; b; c; d) : b < a and c < dg
satises Duality* but fails Symmetry: (0:3; 0:31; 0:2; 0:19) 2 C yet (0:3; 0:2; 0:31; 0:19) 2
I. Note that this criterion also fails Monotonicity, which should not be surprising, in view
of the following result.
Lemma 1 If a criterion satises Duality* and Monotonicity, then it satises Symmetry.
Proof. Suppose that a criterion (C; I; S) satisfy Duality* and Monotonicity but fails
Symmetry. We consider four cases.
Proof. We consider four cases.
Case 1: (a; b; c; d) 2 C but (a; c; b; d) 2 S. By Duality* (b; a; d; c) 2 S and (c; a; d; b) 2
C. By Monotonicity c > b. Applying Duality* to the rst two datapoints we get
(c; d; a; b) 2 S and (b; d; a; c) 2 C, and then by Monotonicity b > c, a contradiction.
Case 2: (a; b; c; d) 2 C but (a; c; b; d) 2 I. By Duality* (b; a; d; c) 2 S and (c; a; d; b) 2
I. By Monotonicity c > b. Applying Duality* to the rst two datapoints we get
(c; d; a; b) 2 S and (b; d; a; c) 2 I, and then by Monotonicity b > c, a contradiction.
Cases 3 and 4 where (a; b; c; d) 2 S and (a; c; b; d) 62 S are similar.
Hence,
Corollary 1 There exists no criterion that satises Duality*, Monotonicity and Respon-
siveness.
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Finally, the clash between correlation and monotonicity properties can also be observed
from a di¤erent angle. Consider:
I Monotonicity
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 I, (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , and a0  a, b0  b and c0  c, with at least one
inequality strict, then (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 C.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 I, (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , and a0  a, b0  b and c0  c, with at least one
inequality strict, then (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 S.
Loosely, I Monotonicity says that, if the goods are independent, then increasing joint
consumption while decreasing single good consumption makes them complementary. This
monotonicity property incorporates a responsiveness requirement: essentially, it implies
that the Independence area is thin, as is the case for all standard denitions of comple-
mentarity/substitutability.
Theorem 2 There exists no criterion that satises Symmetry, I Monotonicity, and Du-
ality.
Proof: Suppose that (C; I; S) satises the axioms. Take p = (a; a; b; b) with b > a. It
cannot be (a; a; b; b) 2 S, for then by Duality (a; a; b; b) 2 C, a contradiction. Similarly, it
cannot be (a; a; b; b) 2 C. Then (a; a; b; b) 2 I. By Symmetry, (a; b; a; b) 2 I. By Duality
(b; a; b; a) 2 I. But this contradicts I Monotonicity.
4 Possibilities
We now turn to resolutions of the conicts. We analyse three plausible criteria, corre-
lation, additivity and maxmin. Correlation is obtained by preserving Duality and appro-
priately modifying the monotonicity properties. For the other two criteria, we retain the
monotonicity properties but vary the notion of duality. A duality operation produces the
opposite behaviour to a given one, and a duality property in our context asserts, loosely,
that if a datapoint is classied in a certain way, then its dual is classied in the oppo-
site way. This is an intuitive requirement but, as we will see, there are other reasonable
ways to interpret the concept of opposite behaviour, hence other reasonable versions of
duality.
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We will focus on criteria that satisfy the following regularity condition: If (a; b; c; d) 2
I, (b; a; c; d) 2 I and (c; b; a; d) 2 I, then a = b = c. It is easy to check that all three
criteria that we shall characterise satisfy it, and that so does the supermodularity criterion.
4.1 Correlation
Recall that according to the correlation criterion two goods are complements (substitutes)
if their consumption is positively (negatively) correlated. While, as we have seen, the
criterion fails Monotonicity, it satises a di¤erent monotonicity condition. Let us write,
for any vector q 2 <4++,
q =
1P
qi
q
so that q 2 T .
Scale Monotonicity
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C and m  n > 0, then (ma; nb; c; d) 2 C.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S and n  m > 0, then (ma; nb; c; d) 2 S.
3) If (a; b; c; d) 2 I, then (ma; nb; c; d) 2 I (2 C, 2 S) if m = n (> n, < n):
Suppose that the total time spent reading the online version (alone or together with
the print version) changes, but the time spent reading the online version alone decreases
(resp., increases) as a proportion of the time spent reading both versions. Suppose also
that the time left is allocated exactly in the same proportion as before between reading the
print version and not reading either version. Parts (1) and (2) of Scale Monotonicity say
that if the initial consumption pattern indicated complementarity (resp., substitutabil-
ity) , then the new consumption pattern should also indicate complementarity (resp.,
substitutability). Part (3) of the axioms states a similar idea based on I-Monotonicity.
Theorem 3 A criterion satises Symmetry, Duality and Scale Monotonicity if and only
if it is the correlation criterion.
Proof: That the three axioms are necessarily satised by the correlation denition is
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trivial. Suppose that a criterion (C; I; S) satises the three axioms. Begin by noting that
(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 C ,
pxy
pxy + py
> pxy + px
, pxy (1  pxy   px   py) > pxpy
, pxyp? > pxpy
and similarly (pxy; px; py; p?) 2 S , pxyp? < pxpy. Then, since C, I and S form a
partition, the result follows from the following three claims.
Claim 1: C  f(a; b; c; d) 2 T : ad > bcg. Take (a; b; c; d) 2 C and suppose towards a
contradiction that ad  bc: It follows that minfa; dg  maxfb; cg. Symmetry and Duality
imply that w.l.o.g. we can assume d  a and b  c so that d  c.
We will show that b < a. First note that (d; c; b; a) 2 C by Symmetry and Duality. By
Scale Monotonicity (recall d  c) ( c
d
d; d
c
c; b; a) = (c; d; b; a) 2 C. Now Using Symmetry
and Duality again we get (a; b; d; c) 2 C. Duality gives (b; a; c; d) 2 S. Now if b  a,
applying Scale Monotonicity (a
b
b; b
a
a; c; d) = (a; b; c; d) 2 S, a contradiction. Hence b < a
as we wanted to show.
We have (a; ad
bc
b; c; d) = (a; ad
c
; c; d) 2 C by Scale Monotonicity since ad
bc
 1. By Sym-
metry and Duality (d; ad
c
; c; a) 2 C. Applying Scale Monotonicity again, ( c
d
d; c
d
ad
c
; c; a) =
(c; a; c; a) 2 C. Apply Symmetry and Duality again and we get (a; c; a; c) 2 C. By
SM ( b
a
a; d
c
c; a; c) = (b; d; a; c) 2 C since ad  bc gives d
c
 b
a
. Finally this implies, by
Symmetry and Duality, that (a; b; c; d) 2 S, contradiction.
Claim 2: S  fad < bcg. Take (a; b; c; d) 2 C and suppose towards a contradiction
that ad  bc: It follows that minfb; cg  maxfa; dg. Symmetry and Duality say that
w.l.o.g. we can assume a  d and c  b so that c  d.
We will show that a < b. First note that (d; c; b; a) 2 S by Symmetry and Duality. By
Scale Monotonicity (recall c  d) ( c
d
d; d
c
c; b; a) = (c; d; b; a) 2 S. Now Using Symmetry
and Duality again we get (a; b; d; c) 2 S. Duality gives (b; a; c; d) 2 C. Now if a  b,
applying Scale Monotonicity (a
b
b; b
a
a; c; d) = (a; b; c; d) 2 C, a contradiction. Hence a < b
as we wanted to show.
We have (a; ad
bc
b; c; d) = (a; ad
c
; c; d) 2 S by Scale Monotonicity since ad
bc
 1. By Sym-
metry and Duality (d; ad
c
; c; a) 2 S. Applying Scale Monotonicity again, ( c
d
d; c
d
ad
c
; c; a) =
(c; a; c; a) 2 S. Apply Symmetry* and Symmetry to get (a; c; a; c) 2 S. By Scale
Monotonicity ( b
a
a; d
c
c; a; c) = (b; d; a; c) 2 S since ad  bc gives d
c
 b
a
. Finally this
implies, by Symmetry and Duality, that (a; b; c; d) 2 C, contradiction.
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Claim 3: I  fad = bcg. Take (a; b; c; d) 2 I and suppose towards a contradiction that
ad < bc. Then set w.l.o.g. d < c and consequently, using part (3) of Scale Monotonicity in
an exact adaptation of Claim 1, a > b. The rest of the argument mirrors that in Claim 1.
Similarly follow, with the obvious necessary modications, the proof of Claim 2 if ad > bc.
4.2 Additivity
As noted before, the additivity criterion given in Example 2 is symmetric and monotonic.
It also satises the notion of duality based on the operation illustrated below:
y  y
x a c
 x b d
!
y  y
x b+ c a
 
c
b+c

 x a
 
b
b+c

d
.
The operation consists of exchanging Total single good consumption with Joint con-
sumption (with the joint consumption allocated to the two goods in proportion to the
amounts that were consumed singly).
(T,J)-Duality For  = b
b+c
:
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C, then (b+ c; a; (1  ) a; d) 2 S .
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S, then (b+ c; a; (1  ) a; d) 2 C.
(T,J)-Duality says that the duality operation above transforms complementarity into sub-
stitution and viceversa. For example, if online and print newspapers are complements for
a consumer who reads both versions two thirds of the time and a single version (either
print or online) one fourth of the time, then they must be substitutes for a consumer who
reads both versions one fourth of the time and the single versions two thirds of the time.
Note that if (a0; b0; c0; d0) is a (T,J)-dual to (a; b; c; d) in the sense of this axiom, i.e., if
a0 = b+ c, b0 = ab=(b+ c), c0 = ac=(b+ c) and d0 = d, then (a; b; c; d) is dual to (a0; b0; c0; d0)
in the same way as well. Consequently, (T,J)-Duality implies: if (a; b; c; d) 2 I, then 
a+ b; ab
a+b
; ac
a+b
; d

2 I:
Theorem 4 A criterion satises Monotonicity, I Monotonicity and (T,J)-Duality if
and only if it is the additivity criterion.
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Proof. It is straightforward to show that the additivity criterion satises the three
axioms. Suppose that (C; I; S) satises the three axioms. The result follows from the
following three claims.
Claim 1: C  f(a; b; c; d) 2 T : a > b + cg. Suppose towards a contradiction that
(a; b; c; d) 2 C and a  b+ c. By (T,J)-Duality, (b+ c; ab=(b+ c); ac=(b+ c); d) 2 S. Since
a= (b+ c)  1 this contradicts Monotonicity.
Claim 2: S  f(a; b; c; d) 2 T : a < b+ cg. The proof is symmetric to that of Claim 1.
Claim 3: I  f(a; b; c; d) 2 T : a = b + cg. Suppose that (a; b; c; d) 2 I but a < b + c.
(T,J)-Duality yields (b+c; ab=(b+c); ac=(b+c); d) 2 I, which contradicts I-Monotonicity.
Similarly if a > b+ c.
4.3 Maxmin
The Maxmin criterion is a monotonic criterion that di¤ers structurally from the other two
because it has a thick independence region (so that it will not satisfy I Monotonicity).
It expresses yet a di¤erent notion of duality, based on the operation illustrated below:
y  y
x a c
 x b d
!
y  y
x b c
 x a d
Here, the behaviour opposite to a given one is dened by exchanging joint consump-
tion with only one of the single good consumptions. Ideally, we would like to impose a
property of the following type. Suppose that online and print newspapers are comple-
ments for a consumer who, when he reads the print version, also reads the online version
% of the time; then, they must be substitutes for a consumer who, when he reads the
print version, also reads the online version (1  )% of the time (and analogously starting
from substitutability). It is a consequence of our characterisation below that this type of
duality together with Symmetry and Monotonicity leads to another impossibility. So we
use a weakened version of the property, which requires a full switch between complemen-
tarity and substitutability only for (at least) one of the two goods, and settles for merely
switching out of the initial region (possibly to independence) for both goods.
(S,J)-Duality
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1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C then q = (b; a; c; d) =2 C and q0 = (c; b; a; d) =2 C, and at least one of
q 2 S and q0 2 S.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S then q = (b; a; c; d) =2 S and q0 = (c; b; a; d) =2 S, and at least one of
q 2 C and q0 2 C.
Theorem 5 A criterion (C; I; S) satises Symmetry, (S,J)-Duality and Monotonicity if
and only if is the maxmin criterion.
Proof: Necessity is easily checked. For su¢ciency, we show rst thatC  fp : pxy > max fpx; pygg.
Suppose by contradiction that p = (a; b; c; d) 2 C but a  max fb; cg. W.l.o.g. set b  c.
Then by Monotonicity q = (b; a; c; d) 2 C. On the other hand, (1) of (S,J)-Duality implies
that q =2 C, a contradiction.
Next, we show fp : pxy > max fpx; pygg  C. Suppose not, and let a > max fb; cg with
p = (a; b; c; d) =2 C. Suppose rst that p 2 S. Then by Monotonicity q = (b; a; c; d) 2 S
but by (2) of (S,J)-Duality q =2 S, contradiction. Suppose then that p 2 I. Let q =
(b; a; c; d) and q0 = (c; b; a; d), and assume w.l.o.g. (by Symmetry) that b  c. If q 2 S,
then by Symmetry (b; c; a; d) 2 S, so that by Monotonicity q0 2 S; but then by (2) of
(S,J)-Duality we should have either p 2 C or q 2 C, a contradiction. If q 2 C, then by
Monotonicity (since a > b) it must be p 2 C, a contradiction. Therefore q 2 I and p 2 I.
If q0 2 C we contradict Monotonicity, and if q0 2 S, we contradict (2) of (S,J)-Duality.
Therefore q0 2 I. By the regularity condition this implies a = b = c, contradicting the
assumption a > max fb; cg.
The proof for S is analogous, and since (C; I; S) is a partition the result follows.
5 From behaviour to psychology: two examples with
the correlation criterion
So far we have followed a rigorously behavioural approach, eschewing any hypothesis on
the choice process that generates the data. Sometimes, though, one may entertain a
hypothesis on the decision process that has generated the data. Even so, the previous
analysis can be useful. We can ask what the psychological primitives must look like in a
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model for behavioural complementarity to be observed. In this way, we can obtain non-
obvious complementarity conditions expressed, e.g., in terms of preferences, but justied
by purely behavioural properties.
To perform this exercise we need to postulate some decision models: we study two
polar representatives. The rst is the logit model, in which preferences are random
and applied to a deterministic set. The second model is a simplication of the stochastic
choice model in Manzini andMariotti [12] and Brady and Rehbeck [4], in which preferences
are deterministic but there is randomness in the subset of alternatives that are actively
considered by the agent. For reasons of space, we perform the analysis only for the
correlation criterion, which is the case yielding the most intriguing answers. As we shall
see, in both polar cases this criterion implies supermodularity-style conditions on the
psychological primitives.
In the logit model, we assume that each bundle  2 fxy; x; y;?g has a systematic
utility u : fxy; x; y;?g ! R++, and that  is chosen with logit probability, namely
p
(u;)
logit () =
exp
 
u

P
2fxy;x;y;?g exp
 
u

 (1)
where  > 0 is a scaling factor (measuring the variance of the underlying Gumbel er-
rors, see McFadden [13]). In this specication, purely random behaviour (i.e. uniform
distribution on fxy; x; y;?g) is obtained in the limit as  tends to innity and rational
deterministic behaviour is obtained for  = 0.
In the stochastic consideration set model the agent has a preference relation  on
fxy; x; yg. The agent considers each nonempty bundle  with a probability  2 (0; 1)
independent of . The agent chooses a bundle by maximising  on the set of bundles
that he considers. In the event that the agent does not consider any bundle, the agent
picks the empty bundle. Note that unlike in the multinomial logit case we are only given
ordinal preference information.5 Therefore  is chosen with probability
p(;)cons () =
(
 (1  )() if  2 fxy; x; yg
(1  )3 if  = ?
(2)
where
 () = jf 2 fxy; x; yg :   gj:
5In Manzini and Mariotti [12] and Brady and Rehbeck [4] the consideration coe¢cients depend, re-
spectively, on the individual alternatives and on the menu.
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Then in the logit model the correlation criterion yields:
p
(u;)
logit 2 C
,
euxy=
euxy= + eux= + euy= + eu?=
euxy= + eux=
euxy= + eux= + euy= + eu?=
>
euxy= + euy=
euxy= + eux= + euy= + eu?=
, euxy=eu?= > eux=euy=
, uxy + u? > ux + uy
and similarly
p
(u;)
logit 2 S , uxy + u? < ux + uy
That is:
 in the two-good logit model x and y are complementary according to the correlation
criterion if and only if the systematic utility u is strictly supermodular on , and
substitutes if and only if u is strictly submodular.
Remarkably, this holds independently of the scaling factor . As we shall see, this scale
independence property is lost as soon as we consider a multi-good case. Note also that
this complementarity condition is not invariant to monotonic transformations of utility.
Turning to the stochastic consideration set model, simple calculations show the fol-
lowing:6 provided that  is greater than a threshold value  2 (0; 1),
p(;)cons 2 S , x  y  xy or y  x  xy
p(;)cons 2 C for any other preference ordering
That is:
6For example, if x  y  xy, then x and y are complementary with the correlation criterion i¤
(1  )
2

(1  )
2
+ 
> (1  )
2
+ (1  )
Thus it is easy to check that there exists a unique  2 (0; 1) such that x and y are complementary for
 < , substitutes for  >  and independent for  = .
19
 In the two good stochastic consideration set model and for  su¢ciently high, x
and y are complementary according to the correlation criterion if and only if joint
consumption is not at the bottom of the preference ordering, and they are substitutes
otherwise.
Since the model uses ordinal information on preferences, unlike in the logit case, we
have obtained a purely ordinal preference condition for complementarity/substitutability.
5.1 The multi-good case
The two-good case is in some respects very specic, as some relevant general features of the
complementarity conditions (notably the dependence on the psychological parameters)
cannot be understood from it. We now proceed to consider an extension of the correlation
criterion to the multi-good case, and show that then complementarity in both models can
be expressed as a supermodularity condition on preferences, one cardinal an the other
ordinal.
Let X = fx; y; :::g be a nite set of goods, and let  be the power set of X. We are
interested as usual in the complementarity between x and y. A datapoint is a probability
distribution p on , with p () denoting the probability of bundle  2 . Dene the
following sets:
XY = f 2  : x 2 ; y 2 g
X Y = f 2  : x =2 ; y =2 g
XY = f 2  : x =2 ; y 2 g
X Y = f 2  : x 2 ; y =2 g
We study the following generalised correlation criterion:
p 2 C ,
P
2XY p ()P
2XY [X Y p ()
>
X
2XY [ XY
p ()
,
X
2XY
p ()
 
1 
X
2XY
p () 
X
2 XY
p () 
X
2X Y
p ()
!
>
 X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
!
,
X
2XY
p ()
X
2 X Y
p () >
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
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and similarly
p 2 S ,
X
2XY
p ()
X
2 X Y
p () <
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
In this denition, joint consumption of x and y is implicitly interpreted as meaning all
instances of bundles where both x and y are consumed, and single consumption of x
(resp., y) is interpreted as all instances of bundles where x (resp., y) is consumed but
not y (resp., x). Obviously, other interpretations are possible. It could be the case, for
example, that x is consumed together with z but not y because x is complementary to z
but y is not. In this case the consumption of x without y would not express in a clean
way the fact that x and y are substitutes. For example, you may consume 50% of the
time co¤ee and milk and 50% of the time tea and milk, so that according to the criteria
we have studied co¤ee would be independent from milk, while in an intuitive sense they
are complementary. Here we ignore for simplicity this problem.7
5.1.1 Logit
In the logit model (1) generalises to
p
(u;)
logit () =
exp
 
u

P
2 exp
 
u

 for  2 
with u : ! R++, so that with the correlation criterion we have
p
(u;)
logit 2 C ,
X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u


>
X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u


p
(u;)
logit 2 S ,
X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u


<
X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u


Unlike in the two-good case, the scaling factor  now becomes important to assess com-
plementarity. We study the limiting behaviour of the complementarity conditions for 
7As Samuleson [16] discusses, similar conceptual problems in the multi-good case arise also for the
standard elasticity-based denitions. If milk is complementary to co¤ee but it is even more complementary
to tea, a rise in the price of co¤ee, leading to a substitution of tea for co¤ee, will also generate an increase
in the consumption of milk, making milk look like a substitute of co¤ee.
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tending to zero, which captures the case of small errors with respect to utility maximisa-
tion.8
Theorem 6 In the limit for ! 0, according to the correlation criterion
p
(u;)
logit 2 C , max
2XY;2 X Y
(u + u ) > max
2 XY;2X Y
(u + u )
p
(u;)
logit 2 S , max
2XY;2 X Y
(u + u ) < max
2 XY;2X Y
(u + u )
Proof : Note rst that, for all  > 0,X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u


>
X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u


,
 ln
0
@ X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A >  ln
0
@ X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A
Next, dene
k () = max
2 XY;2X Y
u + u

8In the case of large errors (behaviour is almost purely random) it is easy to see that the goods are
always approximately independent according to the correlation criterion:
lim
!1
0
@ X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A = jXY j  j X Y j
= 2n 2  2n 2
= j XY j  jX Y j
= lim
!1
0
@ X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A
so that neither the complementarity nor the substitutability condition can hold in the limit.
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Then we have:
lim
!0
0
@ ln
0
@ X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A
1
A
= lim
!0
0
@ ln
0
@ X
2 XY;2X Y
exp

u + u


exp k ()
exp k ()
1
A
1
A
= lim
!0
0
@k () +  ln X
2 XY;2X Y
exp

u + u

  k ()
1A
= max
2 XY;2X Y
(u + u ) + lim
!0
0
@ ln X
2 XY;2X Y
exp

u + u

  k ()
1A
= max
2 XY;2X Y
(u + u )
To see that the last equality holds, note that each term in the summation is of the
form exp
 
A


, where A  0, and thus is either constant and equal to one or tends to zero
as  tends to zero. Moreover, at least one term is equal to one, so that the logarithm of
the sum remains nite in the limit.
An analogous calculation yields
lim
!0
0
@ ln
0
@ X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A
1
A = max
2XY;2 X Y
(u + u )
from which the result follows.
This result generalises the supermodularity condition we found in the two-good case.
In the multi-good case the highest utility elements are taken as representatives of the
various classes to be used in the two-good supermodularity formula. This role of the max
operator in the formula is interesitng and not obvious a priori.
5.1.2 Consideration sets
Turning to the stochastic consideration set model, the probability of choosing bundle
 2  is dened as
p(;)cons () =
(
 (1  )() if  2 n?
(1  )jn?j if  = ?
(3)
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where  is dened on n? and for all  2 n?
 () = j f 2 n? :   g j
Therefore with the correlation criterion, after simplifying:
p(;)cons 2 C ,
P
2XY (1  )
()P
2XY [X Y  (1  )
()
>
X
2XY [ XY
(1  )()
p(;)cons 2 S ,
P
2XY (1  )
()P
2XY [X Y  (1  )
()
<
X
2XY [ XY
(1  )()
We study the limiting case for  tending to one: this expresses small deviations from
the rationality case in which all alternatives are considered.
For  2 n?, dene the function u given by
u () =   () ,
which is a representation of the preference .
Theorem 7 In the limit for ! 1, according to the correlation criterion
p(;)cons 2 C , max
2XY;02 X Y
(u () + u (
0)) > max
2X Y ;02 XY
(u () + u (
0))
p(;)cons 2 S , max
2XY;02 X Y
(u () + u (
0)) < max
2X Y ;02 XY
(u () + u (
0))
Proof : Fixing the preference , let  denote the best bundle. Note that all terms
 (1  )() tend to zero as ! 1 except the one corresponding to  (since () = 0).
We consider four cases, depending on whether  is in XY , XY , X Y or X Y .
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Simple calculations9 show that the complementarity condition can be written as
X
2XY
p () >
P
2X Y p ()
P
2 XY p ()P
2 X Y p ()
(4)
Suppose  2 XY . The LHS in (4) tends to one as  ! 1 (all terms in the sum tend to
zero except p ()). In the RHS all terms in the sums tend to zero, so that the limit of
the RHS depends on a comparison between the minimum powers of (1  ) that appear
in the numerator and in the the denominator, respectively. More precisely, the RHS can
be written asP
2X Y ;02 XY  (1  )
()  (1  )(
0)P
2 X Y n?  (1  )
() + (1  )jn?j
=
2
P
2X Y ;02 XY (1  )
()+(0)

P
2 X Y n? (1  )
() + (1  )jn?j
So, given that jn?j >  () for all  2 n?, if
min
2X Y ;02 XY
( () +  (0)) > min
2 X Y n?
 ()
then the RHS tends to zero and therefore the complementarity condition holds in the
limit, whereas if the reverse inequality holds then the RHS tends to innity and the goods
are substitutes for  large enough. In summary:
Fact 1: Let  2 XY . Then, for  ! 1, p(;)cons 2 C (2 S) according to the correlation
criterion if there are strictly fewer (strictly more) than min2X Y ;02 XY ( () +  (
0))
bundles that are preferred to the best bundle in X Y .
A similar analysis solves the other cases:
9To see this observe the following:P
2XY p ()P
2XY [X Y p ()
>
X
2XY [ XY
p (),
X
2XY
p () >
X
2XY [X Y
p ()
X
2XY [ XY
p () =
=
X
2XY
(p ())
2
+
X
2XY
p ()
X
2 XY
p () +
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2XY
p () +
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
,
X
2XY
p ()
0
@1  X
2XY
p () 
X
2 XY
p () 
X
2X Y
p ()
1
A > X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
,
X
2XY
p ()
X
2 X Y
p () >
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p (),
X
2XY
p () >
P
2X Y p ()
P
2 XY p ()P
2 X Y p ()
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Fact 2: Let  2 X Y . Then, for  ! 1, p(;)cons 2 C (2 S) according to the correlation
criterion if there are strictly fewer (strictly more) than min2X Y ;02 XY ( () +  (
0))
bundles that are preferred to the best bundle in XY .
Fact 3: Let  2 XY . Then, for  ! 1, p(;)cons 2 C (2 S) according to the correlation
criterion if there are strictly fewer (strictly more) than min2XY;02 X Y ( () +  (
0))
bundles that are preferred to the best bundle in X Y .
Fact 4: Let  2 XY . Then, for  ! 1, p(;)cons 2 C (2 S) according to the correlation
criterion if there are strictly fewer (strictly more) than min2XY;02 X Y ( () +  (
0))
bundles that are preferred to the best bundle in XY .
Now we can summarise these facts into a single statement by noting that, by denition,
if R 2

XY; XY; X Y ;X Y
	
is such that  2 R, then
min
2R
 () = 0
Therefore by inspection of the four conditions we can conclude that, in the limit for
! 1, according to the correlation criterion
p(;)cons 2 C , min
2XY;02 X Y
( () +  (0)) < min
2X Y ;02 XY
( () +  (0))
p(;)cons 2 S , min
2XY;02 X Y
( () +  (0)) > min
2X Y ;02 XY
( () +  (0))
which proves the result.
Strikingly, the condition in the statement is an exact ordinal analog of the condition
obtained for the rationality limit of the logit case, in which the utility of a bundle  is
measured by (the opposite of) the number of bundles better than . One way of under-
standing this analogy is to think that both models are special cases of the RUM family,
and that both models are based on an underlying preference. When the parameters of
these models converge to rationality, the deterministic preference e¤ect (as opposed to
the stochastic e¤ect) dominates. The correlation denition of complementarity captures
the complementarity information contained in these unbiased preference. However, in
the multinomial logit case, preference is cardinal, while in the mood model preference is
ordinal: the numerical analogy between the conditions of the two models holds for one
utility representation of  but it may not hold for other, ordinally equivalent, represen-
tations.
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6 Related literature
While referring to Samuelson [16] for an erudite discussion of the literature on complemen-
tarity up to the 70s, we mention here some notable more recent works. It is a surprising
fact that the full behavioural implications of the classical denitions of complementarity
and substitutability, based on cross price elasticities, have only recently been uncovered,
in two papers by Chambers, Echenique and Shmaya ([6] and [7]). The key di¤erence
between their work and ours is that their hypothetical data include observations of con-
sumption decisions for di¤erent prices (as the classical denition requires), whereas ours
are based on consumption decisions alone.
The work by Gentzkow [9] we have already mentioned asks the question of whether
online and print versions of a newspaper are complements or substitutes. Within a ran-
dom utility model, he analyses the identication of complementarity (as opposed to taste
correlation) in the data by using exogenous variations in factors that do not interact
with preferences. This requires the development of an innovative econometric identica-
tion technique which, however, is meaningful only within the random utility model. Our
approach, in contrast, is to investigate whether complementarity or substitution can be
identied in a model-free fashion.
A large literature exists in which supermodularity of a utility function gives, by de-
nition, a complementarity relationship between the goods, and likewise submodularity
is equivalent to substitutability (see for example Bikhchandani and Mamer [3], Gül and
Stachetti [11] for applications of submodularity and related notions of substitutability in
general equilibrium models with indivisibilities.10) These denitions are cardinal. Com-
plementarity in the form of supermodularity is also the bread and butter of modern
monotone comparative static techniques as surveyed by Topkis [17]. Our approach is
a complement to this line of work, in that our axiomatic analysis starts with the data,
rather than with the underlying preference.
10See Baldwin and Klemperer [2] for an innovative approach (based on tools from tropical geometry)
that yields complements/substitutes types of conditions for the existence of equlibria with discrete goods.
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7 Concluding discussion
While correlation in consumption or usage data is usually taken as a behavioural indicator
of complementarity, we have shown that, in general, criteria for complementarity based
on statistical association conict with a basic monotonicity requirement. Our axiomatic
analysis suggests that if monotonicity is considered important, then di¤erent criteria (ad-
ditivity and maxmin) may be preferable.
We have illustrated that the theoretical distinction between criteria is also relevant in
practice, since correlation, additivity and maxmin give strongly contrasting indications
using the data found in a leading application (Gentzkow [9]).
The conclusions from the study of two specic RUM models are intriguing. In that
context, we have shown that identifying complementarity with correlation is equivalent, in
terms of primitives, to identifying complementarity with a special form of supermodularity
of the utility function. Because supermodularity is a natural and accepted criterion for
complementarity when expressed in terms of utility, this might be taken as a validation of
the correlation criterion, at least for the case where the mechanism of choice is described
by one of the models examined. But our ndings also have an alternative interpretation.
They could be taken as an indication that, for the case of random choice over bundles,
supermodularity in utility over bundles is in itself a poor or at least insu¢cient descriptor
of complementarity. One reason for this interpretation in, for example, the logit model is
the following. The cross-partial of utility (uxy   ux)   (uy   u?) may be positive while
at the same time u? > uxy. In this case, correlation in the data must be driven by the
lack of joint consumption (that is, p? is high) rather than by joint consumption, which is
unintuitive. Consider again the data in table 1. There, the proportion of people who read
both versions is only about one third of the proportion of people that did not read either
version. The positive correlation is mostly driven by the latter proportion: do we really
want to say that the versions are complementary because of the lack of joint consumption
(with the correlation possibly lost if joint consumption increases)? In fact, the additivity
criterion picks this up and declares the goods substitutes rather than complements. Also,
a positive cross-partial of utility is compatible with uxy < max fux; uyg. Then once
again positive correlation can only be driven by a high proportion of non-consumers. In
the table, the proportion of people who read both versions is less than one third of the
proportion of people that read only the print version. The maxmin criterion picks this up
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by failing to declare complementarity.
In sum, even when preferences govern behaviour (an assumption we have sought to
eschew in our general treatment), it seems that while statistical association in consump-
tion is a natural ingredient of complementarity, statistical association per se ignores some
revealed preference information that is contained in the data and that may be relevant
to assess complementarity. For example, guns and bullets can be safely considered com-
plements but (at least in some countries), people who own a gun are relatively rare: so p?
is high and px and py are very low (lower than joint consumption) and only account, say,
for the collectors of either of the single items. Suppose that after an increase in crime we
observe a massive increase in demand for guns by the joint consumers who worry about
personal safety, with a corresponding increase in the consumption of bullets, whereas
the collectors demand, which is unrelated to self-defense motives, stays unchanged. We
should interpret this shift as an increase in joint revealed preference for both guns and
bullets, and thus conrm our evaluation of guns and bullets as complements. But, as we
have seen, this cannot be guaranteed by the correlation criterion. This criterion treats
the shift analogously to a shift from observing few cases of smokers with lung cancers to
observing many such cases, with the frequencies of smokers with no cancer and of non-
smokers with cancers unchanged. From a purely statistical point of view this may or may
not be evidence of increased correlation, because both the prior probability and the pos-
terior probability of getting cancer conditional on smoking increase with the shift. But an
increase in joint gun/bullet consumption relative to only gun or only bullet consumption
is an act of choice that reveals a relative preference shift in favour of joint consumption
that is not meaningful in the clinical example: there cannot be any act of choice that
reveals a preference for smoking and getting cancer over just smoking.
However, there is a converse aspect to these observations. Our model-free analysis also
rests on the premise that, once we have decided how correlation should be taken account
of in the data, no such observed correlation should be discounted. Indeed, one criticism
that could be made of our approach runs along the following lines. Suppose that we
observe a daily series of online/print news consumptions for an individual at xed prices.
Then each of our denitions will declare whether or not the two versions are complements
or substitutes. A denition of complementarity based on random utility (e.g. Gentzkow
[9]), on the other hand, will distinguish between the case in which the individual derives
more utility from joint consumption than from the sum of the utilities of single-version
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consumption (true complementarity), and the case in which whenever the individual
wakes up in a mood for reading online news he is also likely to be in the mood for reading
the print version - he may simply wake up sometimes in the mood for news and some
other times not in the mood for news, independently of the form in which they come
(correlation in taste). Now, we could hold the choices constant and vary whether or not
they indicate true complementarity by changing the correlation in taste, whereas our
denitions will fail to record these changes. But the key point to understand here is that
the kind of complementarity we are trying to capture with our denitions is a related but
separate concept from the random utility based concept of complementarity. The latter
concept is tied to a specic assumption on the process that drives behaviour. But one
could make di¤erent assumptions. Suppose for example that behaviour was driven instead
by random consideration set mechanisms of the type discussed in section 5. Then we
should separate true complementarity from correlation in consideration rather than from
correlation in taste, as our individuals mood is now expressed by a shock in consideration
and not by a shock in taste: he wakes up sometimes considering both types of news media
and sometimes not considering either, while always deriving utility from either in the same
way. This leads to a di¤erent identication problem and likely to a di¤erent measurement
of complementarity. If we only observe behaviour, which of the two measurements of true
complementarity should we regard as truer?11
Our behavioural, model-free approach is designed precisely to cut through this type of
modelling dilemmas. It takes choice data at face value. It serves a di¤erent purpose from
standard denitions: it suits the researcher or user who wishes to be non-committal as to
the mechanism that generates behaviour, which is treated as unknown and unknowable.
We view this approach as a complement, rather than as a substitute, of the standard one.
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